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The Long and Winding Road: The Quest for




When the United States Supreme Court paved the way for the return
of the death penalty in Gregg v. Georgia,' the Court cautioned that "accurate
sentencing information is an indispensable prerequisite to a reasoned deter-
mination of whetlier a defendant shall live or die by a jury of people who
have never before made a sentencing decision."2 Since the Supreme Court's
decision in Furman v. Georgia courts and legislatures in the United States
have grappled with ways to conform their capital sentencing schemes to the
strictures of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.4 This article main-
tains that the Commonwealth of Virginia is failing to meet that challenge
in at least one area. The Virginia courts'refusal to fashion-a consistent rule
to admit evidence of prison life in order to rebut future dangerousness calls
into question the integrity of Virginia's capital sentencing procedure.
Prison life evidence refers to evidence presented by the defense during
the penalty phase that directly rebuts the Commonwealth's contention that
defendant will pose a future threat to prison society. Prison life evidence,
in this context, should concentrate on the security and control methods
* J.D. Candidate, May 2001, Washington & Lee University School of Law; B.S., St.
John's University. The author would like to thank Professor Roger D. Groot, Ashley Flynn,
Kimberly A. Orem, and the entire Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse for their support and
expertise.
1. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
2. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190 (1976) (holding that a death sentence does not
violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments when it is imposed under an adequate
statutory scheme).
3. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
4. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that the
imposition of the death penalty under the Georgia and Texas statutory schemes constituted
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
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employed by correctional institutions. This evidence may be presented in
the form of testimony by Virginia Department of Corrections officials.
This article explores the role of evidence in a capital sentencing pro-
ceeding and travels the path towards its effective and proper use. Part II of
this article outlines various classifications of evidence involved in a capital
sentencing proceeding and describes their respective functions as foundation
for the argument that the Supreme Court of Virginia's rulings on the
admission of prson life evidence have been erroneous. Part II looks
specifically at three Supreme Court of Virginia decisions and their effect on
the status of the admission of prison Ie evidence in capital sentencing
proceedings. This section also looks at a Fourth Circuit decision and its
rational framework as a solution to Virginia's prison life evidence quandary.
Part IV of this article solidifies the argument for the admission of prison life
evidence by referencing several United States Supreme Court decisions that
establish a defendant's right to rebut evidence for which the prosecution has
the burden of proof. Finally, Part V reviews two Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia cases to further support the proposition that prison life evidence
should be admitted in capital cases in order to insure a constitutionally
adequate proceeding. The ultimate destination of this quest for admission
of prison life evidence is a fair and accurate sentencing proceeding that
allows a defendant to challenge the very evidence that may lead to the
stripping of the defendant's most fundamental right - his life.'
II First Things First: Understanding the Function of Evidence in Capital
Sentencing Proceedings
As a preliminary matter, it is crucial to understand the function of each
category of evidence in Virginia capital sentencing proceedings. Misunder-
standing the evidence will necessarily lead to improper characterization of
evidence, which in turn will lead to mistakes. This is where the Supreme
Court of Virginia has been deficient as an initial matter. The court's mis-
conception of the role of certain evidence in capital sentencing has resulted
in the rejection of legal and relevant evidence.' The fundamental rights of
the capital murder defendant have been the casualty of the court s fack of
clarity on the admission ofprison life evidence. Hence it is important to be
dear on the purpose of evidence in order to insure its admission and proper
use.
5. Because at the time of this writing all of Virginia's death row defendants are male,
this article employs the masculine pronoun. See Virginians for Alternatives to the Death
Penalty (visited Nov. 2, 2000) < http://www.vadp.org/mearow.htm> (listing persons on
death row in Virginia). However, not all Virginia capital murder defendants have been male.
See, e.S., Tibbs v. Commonwealth, 525 S.E.2d 579 (Va. Ct. App. 2000); Winclder v. Common-
wealth, 531 S.E.2d 45 (Va. Ct. App. 2000).




The Virginia capital murder statutory scheme requires that the death
penalty is only imposed upon a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that a
defendant is a future danger to society or that the defendant's conduct in
committing the offense was "outrageously or wantonly vile."7 To find
future dangerousness under current Virginia case and statutory law, a jury
must conclude "beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a probability based
upon evidence of the prior history of the defendant or of the circumstances
surrounding the commission of the offense of which he is accused that he
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing
serious threat to society."
8
The function of future dangerousness evidence is to look forward to
predict a defendant's future conduct.9 The Commonwealth uses future
dangerousness evidence to convince the jury that, if spared, the defendant
will commit further violent acts that will present a serious and continuous
threat to society. Future dangerousness evidence relies upon the defendant's
past behavior and the circumstances surrounding the offense to show that
defendant will continue to pose a threat in the future."0 The Common-
wealth may use a broad range of evidence to prove future dangerousness.
Some examples of future dangerous evidence admissible in Virginia capital
cases are as follows: past criminal convictions;"1 unadjudicated misconduct
before or after the capital offense; 2 victim impact evidence;13 expert opinion
7. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4 (Michie 2000).
8. S 19.2-264.4(C). When S 19.2-264.4(C) is read with the overall statutory scheme,
it becomes obvious that the General Assembly intended'that only evidence based on the
defendant's history may be used to establish the future dangerousness predicate. Jason J.
Solomon, Future Dangerousness: Issues and Analysis, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 55, 60-63 (1999). How-
ever, the Supreme Court of Virginia has incorrectly held that evidence relating to the
circumstances surrounding the offense and any matters relevant to sentencing are admissible
to prove future dangerousness. Id.; see Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 807, 813-14
(Va. 1985) (concluding that the fact-finder may include all relevant matters in its future
dangerousness determination, including the circumstances and heinousness of the crime).
9. For a full discussion of the treatment of the future dangerousness predicate in
Virginia, see Jason J. Solomon, Future Dangerousness: Issues andAnalysis, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 55
(1999).
10. See S 19.2-264.4(C).
11. See Fisher v. Commonwealth, 374 S.E.2d 46, 53 (Va. 1988).
12. See Edmonds v. Virginia, 329 S.E.2d 807, 814 (Va. 1987).
13. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991). But see generally Matthew L.
Engle, Due Process Limitations on Victim Impact Evidence, 13 CAP. DEF J. 55. (arguing that




on defendant's propensity for committing criminal acts;" heinousness of the
crime or circumstances;" defendant's lack of remorse; defendant's escape
plan; "'7 defendant's statements to a fellow inmate about past and future
planned crimes;"8 defendant's videotaped confession;" defendant's status as
a parolee at the time of the offense;' and defendant's juvenile record."
B Mitigation
Section 19.2-264.4(B) of the Virginia Code refers to mitigation and reads
in relevant part: "Evidence which may be admissible... may include the
circumstances surrounding the offense, the history and background of the
defendant, and any other facts in mitigation of the offense."' Contrary to
future dangerousness evidence, mitigation evidence looks back at the defen-
dant and the offense in order to determine if death is an appropriate sen-
tence under the circumstances."3 Through mitigation evidence, the defense
seeks to convince the jury that despite a finding of future dangerousness or
vileness, factors relating to past events demand that the -defendant be spared
from death. In other words, mitigation evidence functions to say that
despite the presence of any aggravating factor, defendant should not be
sentenced to death.
The United States Supreme Court has defined mitigation evidence to
include "any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death."" The Virginia statutory scheme provides for the
consideration of certain mitigating factors.2" However, this list is illustrative
14. See Payne v. Commonwealth, 357 S.E.2d 500, 505-06 (Va. 1987).
15. See Quintana v. Commonwealth, 295 S.E.2d 643, 655 (Va. 1982).
16. See Clark v. Commonwealth, 257 S.E.2d 784,790 (Va. 1979).
17. See Frye v. Commonwealth, 345 S.E.2d 267,283 (Va. 1986).
18. Id. at 281-83.
19. See Poyner v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 815, 827-28 (Va. 1985).
20. See Pope v. Commonwealth,'360 S.E.2d 352,360 (Va. 1987).
21. See Beaver v. Commonwealth, 352 S.E.2d 342, 347 (Va. 1987).
22. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(B) (Michie 2000).
23. See Solomon, spra note 9, at 72.
24. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (holding that a death penalty statutory
scheme that precludes consideration of relevant mitigating factors is unconstitutional).
25. See S 19.2-264.4(B). The statute enumerates the following statutory mitigating
factors: insignificant criminal history; extreme mental or emotional distbance at the time
of the crime; victim's participation or consent; defendant's inability to appreciate the
criminality of his actions or conform his conduct to the law; defendant's age; and defendant's
mental retardation. Id.
[Vol. 13:2
PRISON LIFE EVIDENCE 6
and not exhaustive.' The following are examples of mitigation evidence
found admissible in capital cases: expert testimony that defendant suffered
from mental or physical conditions such as depression, bipolar disorder,
intermittent explosive disorder, and borderline personality disorder27
defendant's history of substance abuse;2 defendant's turbulent family
history and troubled youth; 9 defendant's adjustment to incarceration and
good behavior while incarcerated; s° testimony by family, friends, clergy, and
co-workers regarding defendant's loving and kind nature;31 and childhood
abuse suffered by the defendant. 2
C. Rebuttal to Mitigation
Because the Commonwealth carries the burden of proof on the issue
of penalty, it is allowed to rebut the defendant's case for mitigation.3 The
Commonwealth's rebuttal to defendant's mitigation evidence counters the
defendant's assertions that he should not be sentenced to death. In rebuttal,
the Commonwealth seeks to show that the defendant's asserted factors are
not truly mitigating and that he should be put to death: Logically, the
Commonwealth's rebuttal evidence should consist of evidence which
directly disputes or contradicts the defense's mitigation evidence.
D. Rebuttal to Future Dangerousness Evidence
The structure of the Virginia capital sentencing proceeding deteriorates
in regards to the issue of permitting a defendant to rebut the Common-
wealth's future dangerousness evidence. The United States Supreme Court
has stated that
[w]here the prosecution specifically relies on a prediction of future
dangerousness in asking for the death penalty, it is not only the
rule of Lockett and Eddings that requires that the defendant be
26. See Smith v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 135,145 (1979) (mitigating circumstances
are not limited to the five factors expressly stated in the Virginia capital murder statute).
27. See United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803, 821-22 (4th Cir. 2000).
28. See Giarratano v. Procunier, 891 F.2d 483, 488 (4th Cir. 1989).
29. See Eddngs v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112-13 (1982).
30. See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 7 (1986) (plurality opinion).
31. See Vinson v. Commonwealth, 522 S.E.2d 170, 175 (Va. 1999).
32. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 312 (1989).
33. See Smith v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 135,150 (Va. 1978) (finding that "(S] 19.2-
264.4(C) places upon the Commonwealth the burden of proving aggravating circumstances
beyond a reasonable doubt" and that "the party having the affirmative of the issue has the
right to open and conclude the argument before the jury'") (internal citation omitted).
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offered an opportunity to introduce evidence on this point; it is
also the elemental due process requirement that a defendant not be
sentenced to death "on the basis of information which he had no
opportunity to deny or explain."'
Despite this clear statement on the admissibility of evidence to rebut future
dangerousness, Vir iia courts have been inconsistent in admitting evidence
that rebuts danger.-
Like future dangerousness evidence itself, this type of rebuttal evidence
is prospective.' The evidence looks to the future to dispel the Common-
wealth's notion that defendant will be a future danger."' Rebuttal to future
dangerousness evidence communicates to the jury that there is little chance
that the defendant will commit further acts of violence.38 The following list
is demonstrative of evidence offered to rebut future dangerousness: expert
testimony that defendant does not show a high probability of being a
danger;39 parole ineligibility;' ° testimony that a person's dangerousness
decreases with age;41 defendant's good behavior while awaiting trial;4 and
prison life evidence. 3
E. Surrebuttal
Although not offered frequently, surrebuttal evidence is admissible to
respond to any new matter brought up on rebuttal." This evidence is
admissible "if it contradicts or alters the import of material evidence intro-
duced for the first time in rebuttal."5 Surrebuttal evidence that is cumula-
34. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 n.1 (1986) (citing Gardner v. Florida, 430
U.S. 349, 362 (1977)); see Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982) (holding thai -the
sentencer ... not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a
defendant's character or record and any circumstances of the offense that the defendant
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death") (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604
(1978)).
35. See infra notes 49-63 and accompanying text.
36. See Solomon, supra note 9, at 73.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See Saunders v. Commonwealth, 406 S.E.2d 39,43 (Va. 1991).
40. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 169 (1994); see also Ramdass v.
Angelone, 187 F.3d 396, 400 (4th Cir. 1999).
41. See Edmonds v. Virginia, 329 S.E.2d 807, 813 (Va. 1985).
42. See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 3-5 & a.1 (1986).
43. See discussion infra Part IV.
44. United States v. King, 879 F.2d 137, 138 (4th Cir. 1989).
45. Quintana v. Commonwealth, 295 S.E.2d 643, 650 (Va. 1982).
[Vol. 13:2
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tive or simply duplicates evidence that has been presented is admitted at the
discretion of the trial court.*
Surrebuttal evidence is offered effectively to contradict new evidence
presented on rebuttal. This evidence allows a defendant to present evidence
not formerly presented in mitigation. The surrebuttal evidence challenges
new evidence by the Commonwealth that cannot be effectively addressed
through cross-examination alone."' An example of surrebuttal evidence in
the capital context is defense expert testimony disputing the testimony of a
Commonwealth expert who offered new psychiatric evidence on rebuttal.
III Prison Life Evidence in Virginia Capital Sentencing Proceedings
A. The Supreme Court of Virginia Cases
The Supreme Court of Virginia's treatment of the roles of evidence in
capital sentencing proceedings has greatly contributed to the difficulties in
the admission of prison life evidence. The following cases illustrate the
court's handling, or mishandling, of prison life evidence.
1. Cherrix v. Commonwealth
Brian Lee Cherrix ("Cherrix") was convicted in the Circuit Court of
Accomack County of capital murder and was sentenced to death. 9 During
mitigation at the sentencing phase, Cherrix sought to offer the testimony of
an expert penologist, several officials from the Virginia Department of
Corrections, a criminologist, a sociologist, and an inmate serving a life
sentence in a Virginia prison presumably to show how prison life would
significantly diminish defendant's possible dangerous behavior.' On appeal,
the Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with the trial court's conclusion that
"'what a person may expect in the penal system' is not relevant mitigation
evidence."" Because the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that the
testimony did not relate to Cherrix's history or experience, it affirmed the
trial court's exclusion of the evidence.'2
46. See United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803, 821-24 (4th Cir. 2000).
47. See id. at 824.
48. See id. at 821-24.
49. Cherrix v. Commonwealth, 513 S.E.2d 642, 646-47 (Va. 1999).
50. See id. at 653.




2. Walker v. Commonwealth
Darrick Demorris Walker ("Walker") was convicted of capital murder
and was sentenced to death.53 At sentencing, Walker sought to introduce
the testimony of the Chief of Operations of the Virginia Department of
"Corrections official as mitigation evidence.' The testimony was to describe
prison conditions, specifically life without parole in a maximum security
iacility:s" The Supreme Court of Virginia tersely rejected Walker's prof-
fered evidence as inadmissible based on the court's holding in Cberrix.s'
3. Vinson v. Commonwealth
In 1998, Dexter Lee Vinson ("Vinson") was convicted of capital murder
and sentenced to death. 7 During the sentencing phase, two mental health
experts testified in defendant's case for mitigation. Each doctor diagnosed
Vinson as suffering from "intermittent explosive disorder," which prevented
him from conforming his conduct to the law at the time of the offenses."9
The Commonwealth presented the testimony of its own mental health
expert who agreed with the defense experts' diagnoses, but concluded there
was at least a fifty-percent chance that Vinson would commit another
violent c-rime within the next five years.60 On appeal to the Supreme Court
of Virginia, Vinson argued that the trial court erroneously allowed the
Commonwealth to present rebuttal testimon as to his future dangerousness
in response to defense's mitigation evidence. Oddly, the court found that
the defense's experts indirectly testified regarding Vinson's dangerousness
because they referred to the defendant's mental condition and offered
excuses for his behavior.6' Hence, the court found that it was proper for the
Commonwealth to rebut the evidence.
3
53. Walker v. Commonwealth, 515 S.E.2d 565, 568 (Va. 1999).
54. Id. at 574.
55. Id.
56. Id. (citing Cherrix, 513 S.E.2d at 653 (holding that prison life evidence was not
proper mitigation evidence because it did not relate to the defendant's history or experience)).
57. Vinson v. Commonwealth, 522 S.E.2d 170, 172-73 (Va. 1999).
58. Id. at 175. .
59. Id. The defendant's ability to conform his conduct to the law at the time of the
offense is a statutory mitigating factor. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(B) (Michie 2000).
60. Vinson, 522 S.E.2d at 175.
61. 'd.at 178.
62. Id. The court's finding is odd because looking back at the defendant's mental state
at the time of the offense in an effort to explain the defendant's behavior is the exact function
of mitigation evidence. See supra notes 22-32 and accompanying text.
63. Vinson, 522 S.E.2d at 178.
366 [Vol. 13:2
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4. Analytical Deficiencies in Cherrix, Walker, and Vinson
a. Cherrix and Walker
The Supreme Court of Virginia in Cherrix and Walker unequivocally
held that prison life evidence is not proper mitigation evidence." What
these cases do not unequivocally state is whether prison life evidence is
admissible to rebut the Commonwealth's future dangerousness showing.
Prison life evidence, like other evidence used to rebut dangerousness, di-
rectly refutes the Commonwealth's contention that the defendant will pose
a continuing threat to society. Because the Commonwealth has the burden
of proving danger beyond a reasonable doubt, it follows that the defendant
be allowed to meet this evidence with his own evidence. However, the
Supreme Court of Virginia has not yet interpreted the situation this way,
but instead has chosen to'deny the defendant an opportunity to respond to
the Commonwealth's case in chief. Clearly, this contradicts notions of
fundamental fairness guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment." The
court completely ignores the crucial point that -despite the defendanit's
mislabeling of the evidence, he should have been lowed to rebut the
Commonwealth's future dangerousness showing. Because neither Walker
nor Cherrix sought to introduce prison life evidence as rebuttal to the
Commonwealth's assertion of future dangerousness, the court was not
forced to actually decide whether a defendant is allowed to -rebut the
Commonwealth's case with prison life evidence. If Cherrix and Walker had
in fact expresslyclassified the prison life evidence as rebuttal evidence rather
than mitigation, the court's decisions undoubtedly would be erroneous.
b. Vinson
Any skepticism on the order and admissibility of evidence during
sentencing was increased tenfold after the Supreme Court of Virginia's
decision in Vinson. Vinson was decided nine months after Cberrix and five
months after Walker, yet the decision is shamelessly incongruent with both.
The Vinson court's analysis is erroneous and suffers from faulty reasoning.
The court incorrectly characterized defense's statutory mitigation evidence
as anti-future dangerousness evidence and erroneously allowed the Com-
monwealth to rebut it with further future dangerousness evidence.
64. See Cberrix, 513 S.E.2d at 653; Walker, 515 S.E.2d at 574.
65. See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 n.1 (1986) (stating that when the
prosecution seeks death based on future dangerousness, due process requires that the defen-
dant be entitled to present evidence to rebut that notion).
20011
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL
The, court's analysis in Vinson is an example of why it is crucial to
understand the function of evidence in order to insure its correct classifica-
tion. Mitigation is not "anti-future dangerousness evidence." The functions
and purposes of the two are completely different. Mitigation evidence seeks
to account for defendant's past behavior, while future dangerousness evi-
dence aims to predict defendant's future behavior. As one federal circuit
noted, "'[r]ebutting evidence' is that which tends to explain or controvert
evidence produced by an adverse party.... One cannot rebut a proposition
that has not been advanced."6' Evidence offered to show that the defendant
could not conform his conduct to the law at a particular point in time in the
past does not analytically or factually rebut the contention that defendant
will pose a threat at some time in the future.67 The evidence instead asks the
-jury to spare the defendant's life even if it found that the defendant may
pose a future danger. The Supreme Court of Virginia in Vinson failed to
consider this important and evident distinction.
5. Capital Sentencing Proceedings After Cherrix/Walker/Vinson
The Cherrixi Walker! Vinson trilogy has created confusion in the order
of Virginia's capital sentencing proceedings. The apparent course of pro-
ceedings after the three cases is as follows: (1) the Commonwealth presents
its case in chief which will likely include future dangerousness evidence; (2)
the defendant presents mitigation evidence, but is prohibited from rebutting
the Commonwealth's case in chief; (3) despite being precluded from intro-
ducing rebuttal evidence, defendant's statutory mitigation evidence is
classified as anti-future dangerousness evidence; (4) Commonwealth is
allowed to rebut the defendant's incorrectly classified mitigation evidence
with evidence of future dangerousness; (5) defense attorneys go home with
headaches asking themselves what just happened. Fortunately, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit's opinion in United States v.
66. Carter v. Bell, 218 F.3d 581, 598 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Cozzolino v. State, 584
S.W.2d 765,768 (Tenn. 1979)) (holding that the defendant's mitigation evidence was "limited
to an attempt to show the origin, in a troubled childhood, of the defendant's criminal acts"
and that the evidence was "not controverted by the State's demonstration of his present
criminal proclivities"). The Sixth Circuit found that under Tennessee law, the State was
required to show that its rebuttal evidence was relevant to a mitigating factor actually
presented by the defendant and not to the issue of punishment in general. Id.
67. See Latanya R. White, Case Note, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 443, 449-50 (1999) (analyzing
Vinson v. Commonwealth, 522 S.E.2d 170 (Va. 1999)).
68. See Waye v. Commonwealth, 251 S.E.2d 202,212 (Va. 1979) (stating that "the jury
was at liberty, notwithstanding proof of aggravation, to afford the defendant mercy in
consideration of mitigating factors and to fix the lesser punishment of life imprisonment").
[Vol. 13:2
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Bamette'9 offers clarity in the midst of the confusion created by the Supreme
Court of Virginia.7
B. United States v. Barnette
Aquilla M. Barnette ("Barnette") was convicted in North Carolina of
various offenses including a murder that took place in Virginia.71 He was
sentenced to death under the authority of the Federal Death Penalty Act.72
In its case-in-chief at sentencing, the government presented evidence that
Barnette would pose a future danger to society.7" During mitigation and in
rebuttal to the government's future dangerousness evidence, Barnette
presented the testimony of three mental health experts.74 Dr. Cunningham,
a psychologist and risk assessment expert, testified that Barnette presented
a low risk of committing further violent acts in prison."' Before the govern-
ment be an rebuttal, defendant objected to the anticipated testimony of Dr.
Duncan. Duncan, a forensic psychologist, was expected to testify regard-
ing Barnette's dangerousness based on an assessment using the Psychopathy
Checklist Revised.77 The court denied the motion."' In turn, Barnette
moved to have Cunningham remain in the courtroom during Duncan's
testimony." That request was likewise denied.'o Duncan went on to testify
that, per the Psychopathy Checklist Revised, Barnette was a psychopath."1
Prior to Duncan's testimony, there had been no evidence that Barnette was
a psychopath.' Defense counsel cross-examined Duncan on the validity of
69. 211 F.3d 803 (4th Cir. 2000).
70. See United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803 (4th Cir. 2000).
71. Barnmte, 211 F.3d at 810-11.
72. Id. at 811; see 18 U.S.C.A. S 3594 (West 2000) (authorizing a court to sentence a
defendant to death or life imprisonment without possibility of release).
73. Barnette, 211 F.3d at 810 & n.2.
74. Id. at 821-22.
75. Id. This is an example of evidence offered to rebut the Commonwealth's future
dangerousness evidence.
76. Id. at 822.
77. Id. The Psychopathy Checklist Revised is a diagnostic test used to determine
whether a patient is psychopathic. Id. at 811 n.4.







his assessment.83 The defense was not allowed to present its own mental
health expert to rebut the new psychological evidence proffered by
Duncan." The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
'found that it was reversible error not to allow the defense expert to testify
in surrebuttal to contest Duncan's diagnosis of Barnette as a psychopath."
The Fourth Circuit vacated Bamette's death sentence and remanded the case
for a new sentencing hearing.86
Barnette appears to have finally established a firm and proper course
that should be followed in capital sentencing proceedings in Virginia. The
Commonwealth presents evi e toprove future dangerousness or vileness
beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant then presents mitigation evi-
dence as well as evidence to rebut the Commonwealth's case for death. This
rebuttal evidence may include evidence of prison life in order to rebut
evidence that the defendant would pose a future danger. If the defendant
raises new issues on rebuttal, the Commonwealth may introduce its own
rebuttal evidence in response. If in turn, the Commonwealth raises new
issues during its rebuttal, the defendant may introduce evidence in surrebutt-
al with the limitation that it is not cumulative or repetitive of evidence
previously presented.8"
Barnette presents a clear and fair capital sentencing process. The
process preserves the defendant's due process right to rebut future danger-
ousness. The proceeding also eliminates the unfair advantage to the Com-
monwealth of allowing it to rebut defendant's mitigation with additional
evidence of future dangerousness.
IV. The Afiermath: Presenting Prison Life Evidence in the Wake of
Cherrix, Walker, Vinson, and Barnette - The Federal Courts on the Right
to Rebut Future Dangerousness
When the Commonwealth seeks to prove future dangerousness beyond
a reasonable doubt in its case for death, the defendant has an elemental due
process right to rebut the Commonwealth's evidence." In Gardner v.
Florida," the trial court sentenced the defendant to death, relying in part on
a presentence report that contained "confidential" information that had not
83. Id. at 823.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 824-25.
86. Id. at 826.
87. See id. at 824.
88. See infra notes 89-104 and accompanying text.
89. 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
370 [Vol. 13:2
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been previously disclosed to the defendant. 0 In its plurality opinion, the
Court held that imposing a death sentence based on information that the
defendant "had no opportunity to deny or explain" violated Gardner's due
process rights."
In Skipper v. South Carolina,' Ronald Skipper was convicted of capital
murder in South Carolina and sentenced to death.' At sentencing, Skipper
sought to offer the testimony of two jailers and a frequent visitor as evidence
that he had "made a good adjustment to prison" during his time in jail.9'
The trial court found the testimony irrelevant and thus inadmissible.95
During closing arguments the State argued that if sentenced to life, Skipper
would pose a threat to the prison society.' The United States Supreme
Court found that the evidence that a defendant would not pose a danger in
prison is dearly mitigating under Lockett v. Ohio" and Eddings v.
Oklahoma."' Equally important, the Court found that when the prosecu-
tion seeks death based on a prediction of future dangerousness, e emental
due process requires that the defendant be permitted to introduce evidence
to rebut that notion."
In Simmons v. South Carolina,'t the Court in a plurality opinion
reaffirmed the principle announced in Gardner and Skipper that fundamental
notions of due process command that a defendant be allowed to rebut
information that the sentencer may have relied upon in imposing the
sentence.' Specifically, the Court held that due process requires that the
defendant be allowed to introduce evidence of parole ineligibility when the
prosecution raises the issue of defendant's future dangerousness."° Justice
Ginsburg, in her concurrence, asserted that "[wjhen the prosecution urges
a defendant's future dangerousness as a cause for the death sentence, the
90. Gardner v. Florida, 430 US. 349, 352-53 (1977).
91. Id. at 362.
92. 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
93. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 2-4 (1986).
94. Id. at 3.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
98. 455 U.S. 104 (1982). Skipper, 476 U.S. at 4-5; see Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
(1978); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
99. Skipper, 476 U.S. at 5 n.1.
100. 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
101. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 164-69 (1994).
102. Id. at 171.
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defendant's right to be heard means that he must be afforded an opportunity
to rebut the argument." 10 3 Thus, the United States Supreme Court has
dearly pronounced that a defendant has a due process right to rebut the
Commonwealth's argument that a defendant will pose a continuing threat
to society. Evidence of prison life is but one way to rebut that contention.
The Fourth Circuit's holding in Barnette also indicates that a defendant
has a right to rebut the prosecution's future dangerousness evidence. The
court held that "simple fairness" required that the defendant have the ability
to rebut material evidence presented by the Commonwealth."° In its
harmless error review, the court emphasized the importance of psychiatric
evidence in this type of trial and noted that leaving testimony unanswered,
such as that presented by the government in Barnette, can have a devastating
effect on a defendant."' The court concluded that there was a reasonable
possibility that the defense's inability to rebut the government's assertion
may have contributed to the death sentence and that the government had
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless.1" As
a direct result of these findings, the court vacated Barnette's sentence.
10 7
In light of Gardner, Skipper, Simmons, and Barnette, the argument to
admit prison life evidence should be constructed as follows: because capital
defendants in Virginia are ineligible for parole, if spared from death, a
defendant will spend his or her entire natural life in prison."8
Consequently, post-sentencing, prison will be the only society in which the
defendant will ever live. Therefore, the future dangerousness inquiry
necessarily becomes whether the defendant "would commit acts of violence
that would constitute a continuing threat to (prison] society."" 9 A defen-
dant has a due process right to rebut the Commonwealth's evidence that the
defendant will pose a future danger to society. Testimony describing prison
conditions and an inmate's lifestyle in a maximum security facility is essen-
tial to rebut the Commonwealth's contention that a defendant would
103. id. at 174.
104. United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803, 824 (4th Cu. 2000).
105. Id. at 824-25.
106. Id. at 825.
107. Id. at 826.
108. The Virginia General Assembly eliminated parole for all felonies committed after
January 1,1995. See VA. CODE ANN. S 53.1-165.1 (Michie 2000). The General Assembly also
eliminated geriatric parole for all Class 1 felons which includes capital murder defendants.
See VA. CODE ANN. 5 53.1-40.01 (Michie 2000); see also VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-31 (Michie
2000). As a result, defendants convicted of capital murder for offenses committed after
January 1, 1995 are ineligible for parole as a matter of law.
109. See VA CODE ANN. 5 19.2-264.4.C (Mfichie 2000).
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commit future acts of violence that stand to pose a danger to the prison
society.
V. Two Final Thoughts: The Effects ofYarbrough v. Commonwealth on
Trying Capital Cases in Virginia
Robert S. Yarbrough ("Yarbrough") was convicted of capital murder
in Mecklenburg County, Virginia and was sentenced to death. ' During the
penalty phase, the Commonwealth apprised the court of its intention solely
to present evidence to prove vileness."' Hence, the jury was not to be
instructed on future dangerousness.112 Nonetheless, Yarbrough requested
a "life means life" instruction, which informs the jury that if sentenced to
life, he would be ineligible for parole.1
The Commonwealth argued that, under Virginia law, the defendant
was not entitled to a "life means life" instruction because the Common-
wealth had relied exclusively on the vileness aggravator. 14 Yarbrough
renewed his request for an instruction numerous times throughout the
proceeding."' Before the instant case was decided, the Supreme Court of
Virginia had only required a "life means life" instruction where the defen-
dant's future dangerousness was at issue. 16 Prompted by the need for
reliability in sentencing, the court held that the issuance of a "life means life"
instruction was essential to assure that jurors based their determination on
reason as opposed to fear. 17 The court found that not instructing a jury on
defendant's parole ineligibility may cause the ury to speculate and as a result
impose a harsher sentence than warranted.' J
The effects of Yarbrough are at least twofold. First, the holding that all
capital defendants sentenced for offenses committed after 1995 are entitled
to a "life means life" instruction eliminates the Commonwealth's ability to
keep the instruction out by solely proceeding on the vileness aggravator. In
Yarbrough, the defendant contended that the Commonwealth purposely
sought to avoid the applicability of the "life means life" instruction by
110. Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 519 S.E.2d 602, 605-07 (Va. 1999).




115. Id. at 607.
116. Id. at 611-12.
117. Id. at 613-17.
118. Id. at 616.
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keeping future dangerousness out of the case. 9 After Yarbrougb, the Common
wealth no longer has the avoidance of the instruction as an incentive for
keeping danger out of the case. The obvious impact is that danger stays in
the case. Keeping danger in the case is beneficial to the defense because it
allows for the admission of prison life evidence. Prison life evidence, used
effectively, may eliminate the jury's fear that a defendant will pose a danger
to the prison staff and fellow inmates. Testimony on the regimented
lifestyle that a maximum security prisoner leads, as well as testimony
regarding security measures at the facility are examples of prison life evi-
dence.12 If a jury is advised of the restrictiveness of a prisoner's life and the
measures taken to deal with violent inmates, the jury may find that the
defendant will not have significant opportunities to commit violent acts.
Also, whenever possible defense counsel should present other "anti-future
dangerousness" evidence such as the likelihood of violent acts declining with
age, the tendency for improved behavior when inmates are in a controlled
environment, as well as statutory and non-statutory mitigation. These types
of evidence, coupled with prison life evidence, should make a compelling
case for life, especially when vileness is not in the case. Furthermore,
because a court is prohibited from instructing the jury that there is a possi-
bility that the defendant may be granted executive clemency, the jurors are
not led to believe that there is a chance that the defendant will be released
in that manner.'21 Thus, the case for life is made even stronger.
Second, the decision in Yarbrougb compels the admission of prison life
evidence in order to meet the goals of obtaining a fully informed jury" and
consequently, "'truth in sentencing.'- 22 The court in Yarbrougb rejected the
notion that a life means life instruction is triggered by the Commonwealth's
reliance on either the future dangerousness or vileness aggravators.1
24
Instead, the court concluded that the instruction is commanded because of
the need to prevent juries from speculating on "post-sentence" procedures
119. Id. at 606.
120. An inmate sentenced to life without parole will likely be sent to a dose custody
institution. In a dose custody facility, inmates are subject to a multitude of security and
control measures such as constant supervision and observation. Disruptive inmates are
subject to segregation for twenty-three hours per day. Attorney Craig S. Cooley, Remarks
at the Capital Defense Workshop sponsored by the Criminal Law Section of the Virginia Bar
Association (Oct. 27, 2000).
121. See Fishback v. Commonwealth, 532 S.E.2d 629, 634 n.4 (Va. 2000) (holding that
the Commonwealth is not permitted to have an instruction on executive clemency).
122. See Yarbrough, 519 S.E.2d at 616.
123. See Fis/back, 532 S.E.2d at 633.
124. Yarbrough, 519 S.E.2d at 611-16.
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to the defendant's detriment. m The effect of the court's decision is that the
goal of obtaining a fully informed jury and accuracy in sentencing requires
that jurors may not speculate on matters that may lead to unwarranted
imposition of a harsher sentence. Likewise, the Supreme Court of Virginia
in Fisbback v. Commonwealthu6 found that juror speculation on post-sen-
tencing issues is inconsistent with a fair trial.' Although the Supreme
Court of Virginia addressed jury speculation in the specific context of post-
sentencing procedures such as parole and clemency, its rulings in Yarbrough
and Fishback imply that the failure to inform jurors on prison life is incon-
sistent with the goals of accurate sentencing and fairness. Absent prison life
evidence, jurors are left to speculate on the defendant's ability to commit
further acts of violence. Fear that an inmate will "run rampant" in prison
may influence jurors to impose death when a life sentence would otherwise
be appropriate. Informing jurors of the realities of serving a life sentence in
a maximum security prison will better serve the policy of steering jurors
away from harsher penalties based on unwarranted fear.
V. Conclusion
In Woodson v. North Carolina," the United States Supreme Court
opined that
the penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of
imprisonment, however long. Death, in its finality, differs more
from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from
one of only a year or two. Because of that qualitative difference,
there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the
determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a spe-
cific case.' 2'
Woodson was a resounding call by the Court for heightened reliability
in capital sentencing proceedings. Prohibiting a defendant from rebutting
the Commonwealth's case for death with relevant evidence is incompatible
with the Supreme Court's demand for reliable sentencing in capital cases.
The admission of prison life evidence is highly relevant and necessary to
guarantee the capital defendant a fair and accurate trial where future danger-
ousness is at issue. Prison inmates tend to be portrayed in extremes. Either
125. Id. at 615.
126. 532 S.E.2d 629 (Va. 2000).
127. Fishback v. Commonwealth, 532 S.E.2d 629, 634 n.4 (Va. 2000).
128. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
129. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
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prisoners are depicted as violent, uncontrollable predators as in the televi-
sion drama OZ; 13 or they are described as living a life of ease with three
meals a day, virtually unlimited recreation, and cable television. 1  One
New Jersey state senator commented that, "to habitual criminals, prisons are
resorts with televisions, weight-training facilities and libraries that some
colleges would envy.... For a lot of them, jail time is just an extended
vacation."13 ' Prison life evidence is needed to correct the misconceptions
and ignorance surrounding incarceration. Surely fallacies and naivete is not
what the Supreme Court of Virginia had in mind when it referred to a fully
informed jury.
133
The Fourth Circuit in Barnette has taken the first steps by outlining a
coherent process that allows for the admission of prison life evidence."4
Now the Supreme Court of Virginia must take the final steps and at last
allow for the consistent admission of prison life evidence in all capital
sentencing proceedings.13'
130. Oz is a cable television drama which chronicles the lives of inmates in a fictious
correctional facility.
131. See David McCord, ImaginingaRetributivistAlternatiwe to Capital Punisbment, 50
FLA. L. REV. 1, 47 (1998). McCord quoted a letter sent to an editor as one commonly sent
to newspapers across the country and therefore reflective of the public's perception of the
prison experience. The author of the letter described prisons as resorts with:
libraries, televisions, access to phones, medical expenses taken care of by the
taxpayers; also full sized basketball courts, handbalrarea, punching bags, volley-
bal net, electronic exercise bicycles aerobic machines (facing a te evision,
theater groups, music lessons, R-rated movies on television, conjugal visits in a
special building, weight-lifting equipment that causes medical expenses to rise,
ad musical instruments.
Id. McCord also pointed to nationwide news reporting that commented on the "clear-cut
public desire for criminals to do 'harder time.- Id. at 48 (ctations omitted). McCord further
noted that there has been a flood of legislative and administrative initiatives to curtail
prisoners' amenities. Id. (citations omitted).
132. Id. (citing Iver Peterson, Researcer Divided Over Whether No-Frills Prisons Work,
HOUS. CHRON., July 16, 1995, at 12, available in 1995 WL 9393569 (quoting state Senator,
Gerald Cardinale of New Jersey)).
133. See Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 519 S.E.2d 602,616 (Va. 1999).
134. See discussion supra Part IILB.
135. The use of prison life evidence offered to rebut future dangerousness was disap-
proved of in the recent Supreme Court of Virginia case, Burns v. Commonwealth, Nos.
001879, 001880, 2001 W. 208453 (Va. Mar. 2, 2001). Bums will be analyzed in detail in
Volume 14, Number 1 of the Capital Defense Journal in Fall 2001.
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